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Dick Bryan and Michael Rafferty
Money in Capitalism or Capitalist Money?
The wealth of societies in which the capitalist
mode of production prevails appears as an
immense collection of commodities . . .1
From the very first sentence of Marx’s Capital, we
know that capitalism is characterised economically
by two essential features: the commodity and the
competitive drive to accumulate. As the analysis of
both has evolved, money is too often depicted as just
the handmaiden, the oil that lubricates commodity
exchange and that facilitates accumulation, but
without being itself central. With money so readily
pushed to the background, it is not surprising that
much of Marxism tends to dissociate a ‘real’ economy
of goods and services, class relations, and value, 
from a monetary world of representation (and
misrepresentation).
The recent resurgence of an interest in money and
finance is most welcome, for the new prominence of
finance on a global scale has forced Marxists to go
back to some basic questions about the nature of
money in capitalism. The work of Costas Lapavitsas
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2 See especially Lapavitsas 2000.
3 See especially Lapavitsas 2003, Itoh and Lapavitsas 1999, and Fine and Lapavitsas
2000.
4 Indeed, Itoh and Lapavitsas 1999 provide an incisive account of the development
of money.
5 Here, we refer not to credit as deferred payment, but promises to pay circulating
as means of payment, especially under the auspices of banks.
has been a significant contribution, both in recent clarifications of Marx’s
theory of commodity money and credit,2 and in debates about the contemporary
relevance of Marxist analyses of money.3
Few Marxists, and certainly not Lapavitsas, would want to embrace the
above juxtaposition as just stated: money does matter in a capitalist economy.
But this paper poses a further question: what is distinctively capitalist about
money in capitalism – how is capitalist money different from non-capitalist
money, and how does money itself in capitalism reflect the dual dimensions
of commodity and accumulation? In most characterisations, this question is
not posed. Money may play distinct roles within capitalism, but money itself
is not distinctly capitalist.
Accordingly, monetary histories generally focus on the development of
monetary units, reaching their zenith with the formation of the modern state,
which enforces these monetary units, the beginnings of prudential supervision,
and fiat money.4 From there, it is a story of the extension of money’s role, the
development of ‘the credit system’,5 and technological innovations in monetary
transactions. It is as if, with the development of fiat money and the credit
system, money reached its highest imaginable stage of existence. The rest of
monetary history is mere refinement.
A conspicuous effect is that the quantitatively largest development of
capitalist finance – global derivative markets with their transactions amounting
to multiple trillions of US dollars per day – is simply ignored in Marxist
discussions. In this paper, we argue that financial derivatives transform
fundamentally our understanding of money in capitalism.
Financial derivatives take the connection of money to both commodity
exchange and accumulation to a new level. It is not just, as with credit, that
derivatives are used as advances for capitalist accumulation. Financial
derivatives are themselves an expression of capitalist accumulation. Nor is it
just, as with notes and coins, that derivatives facilitate the exchange of
commodities. Derivatives are themselves commodities. They are produced
and traded, not just as titles to ownership, but as packaged systems of
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6 We note the fact that Pryke and Allen 2000 have previously made the argument
that derivatives represent a new form of money, although they develop this via an
engagement with money signs and money’s ‘imaginary’ rather than with theories of
value.
7 See Kay 1991 for a clear Marxist analysis of the importance of the joint-stock
company for capitalism.
conversion between different forms of assets (or revenue streams). Derivatives
are distinctively capitalist money,6 and a recognition of their role serves to
transform debates about Marxist theories of money.
We have all read references to derivatives as tools of speculation, which
need to be stamped out. Forget about these analyses, for they miss the
importance of derivatives in accumulation! The same condemnation was
being made in the mid-nineteenth century about the formation of the joint-
stock company – that the share market divorced ownership from responsibility,
encouraged speculative ownership, and increased the risk of fraud and financial
crises. We know that the stock market did (and still does) provide forums
for speculation, but it also transformed fundamentally the nature of capital,
and created a form of ownership that is distinctively capitalist and could not
exist under feudalism or socialism. Our argument is that financial derivatives
are doing to the nature of money what limited liability and the stock market
did to the nature of ownership.7
Derivatives: an introduction
First, a brief definition, but one that is hardly complete, for those less familiar
with derivatives. Formally defined, financial derivatives are assets whose
value is linked to, and usually understood to ‘derive’ from, another asset
(hence the label ‘derivative’). Derivatives are well understood, and have a
multiple-thousand year history, as futures contracts. A futures contract locks
in a price at a future date. The futures contract may then itself be traded,
with its price varying according to the current and expected price of the
commodity.
More generally, the underlying attribute of the range of different sorts of
derivatives is that they are means for trading risk. Derivatives do facilitate
what is usually called ‘speculation’ when some people desire taking on risk.
But they primarily provide facilities to lay-off risk – called ‘hedging’. In
agricultural markets, futures contracts provide a hedge for both buyers and
sellers on the effects of drought, disease, and so forth and, accordingly, this
HIMA 14,1_f5_74-95I  3/29/06  3:29 PM  Page 77
78 • Dick Bryan and Michael Rafferty
8 See, for instance, Working 1953 for the importance of derivatives to accumulation
in agricultural production and circulation.
9 Bank for International Settlements 2005, p. 15.
10 OTC, or over the counter derivatives, are contracts tailored to two parties, where
a financial institution is the ‘matchmaker’. These are different from exchange-traded
derivatives, where the contracts are bought and sold without the counter party being
necessarily known. While exchange-traded derivatives were predominant in the 1980s,
OTC derivatives are now larger, signalling the shift to formal and planned hedging
strategies by corporations. However, between 2001 and 2004, exchange-traded derivatives
grew in turnover relative to OTC derivatives (Bank for International Settlements 2005,
p. 3).
is where the long history of derivatives lies.8 But what makes derivatives so
important in the current era, and gives them an explicit monetary function,
is both the unprecedented scale of derivative markets, and the fact that they
are now overwhelmingly used to hedge different sorts of financial assets and
money, rather than physical commodities.
In terms of scale, the Bank for International Settlements triennial survey9
shows that in 2004 global daily turnover in foreign exchange and interest rate
derivatives contracts, was $7 trillion per day ($4.7 trillion in exchange traded
derivatives and $2.3 trillion in OTC markets).10 To be sure, part of the derivative
trade is simply gambling on exchange rates and interest rates, but most 
of the remaining transactions involve corporations engaged in hedging.
Corporations of all sizes are utilising derivatives to hedge against interest-
rate and exchange-rate (but also other financial) volatility. This is not a marginal
activity but is central to conventional corporate risk-management strategies.
Unfortunately, this usually only comes to light when risk mis-management
leads to corporate crashes, such as with Long Term Capital Management,
Worldcom, and Enron, but it should not hide the fact that derivative transactions
of the same scale as these three cases are being handled daily by all large
corporations. Once we see beyond ‘speculation’ and look at the forces that
have driven the growth of derivative products for financial assets, the theory
of money on a global scale looks rather different from the one that most
Marxists engage.
Money’s social relations
In explaining financial derivative growth, our analysis has jumped ahead of
itself. The most recognised answer to the question of the capitalist nature of
money emphasises not financial derivatives but the social relations that money
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11 Lapavitsas 2003, pp. 66–7.
12 Aglietta 2002, somewhat surprisingly, provided a sweeping review of the history
and future of money that centres on the issue of trust.
mediates. It is important to review this role, especially as it is central to
Lapavitsas’s analysis of capitalist money.
Money plays the role of a social nexus between strangers, but it also
epitomises alienated social relations – the relations between people appearing
as the relations between things. Here, the emphasis is on two issues: the social
power that money brings, and the trust that lies implicit within complex
financial relations that are extended both temporally and spatially. Both of
these have been addressed extensively, and need but the briefest re-iteration
here.
Money as social power emphasises that those who hold money command
resources. For Lapavitsas:
Money affords its owner power over others. It is misleading to think of the
market as a locus of democratic equality because, presumably, commodity
owners have exactly the same rights and obligations as each other. . . . The
individuals who possess more money can also command more commodities
and natural resources and, in the capitalist mode of production, more workers.
The economic power of money is the source of its social power, making it
possible for the owner to impose his or her will on others by advancing or
withholding money. In turn, money’s power over people and resources
allows its owners constantly to establish new hierarchies of wealth and
privilege.11
In its basic form, this is a power over distribution, in other words, the familiar
argument that people with a lot of money get more than their share of
resources. For Marxists, there is a particular focus on command over one
particular resource: labour-power. From this follows the proposition that
command over labour-power gives command over surplus-value production,
command over accumulation, and hence command over the reproduction of
social power. It is an important story, but it must be recalled that it is primarily
a distributional story, in which the resource ‘labour’ is just a theoretical special
case that invokes the sphere of production. Moreover, even for this special
case, social power over labour is just as much a story of feudalism or slavery,
as it is of capitalism.
The second dimension of the social relations of money is trust.12 Trust, it
is said, is what makes money social, although, insofar as trust is implicit in
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13 This latter domain should certainly be qualified: it is not just credit, but all 
non-cash forms of money that require trust. We are posing financial derivatives as a
form of money, and these, like credit, require trust for their widespread acceptance.
The point here is to challenge the association of trust just with theories of credit money.
14 Simmel 1978, p. 175.
15 Lapavitsas 2003, p. 69.
16 For a discussion, see Turner 1986.
all arms-length exchanges, it is required throughout the process of accumulation.
Furthermore, relations of trust are implicit in exchange in mercantile and
even feudal societies. The issue of trust in relation to money is generally
applied to both the domain of immediate exchange (that the physical monetary
unit is convertible into ‘real’ goods and services), and the domain of credit
(that the institutional money system will convert book entries into physical
money).13 Following principally the seminal work of Georg Simmel, author
of The Philosophy of Money, the issue of trust is associated with the general,
unifying, standardising dimensions of money. Exchange creates, in Simmel’s
term, ‘an inner bond between men – a society, in place of a mere collection
of individuals’.14 For Lapavitsas, the principal relations of trust are intra-
capital, and are associated with the credit system:
Credit is originally a private and subjective relation of trust and power
between capitalists, deployed to promote their individual economic activities.
However, relations of trust and power are transformed in the course of
credit transactions, and gradually acquire a social and objective character. . . .
Relations of trust and power are transformed with the credit system and
acquire an increasingly social content by involving banks, markets, and
other credit institutions. The requirements of credit also become increasingly
social, especially with regard to the information required to support trust.
At the same time, the class nature of the capitalist mode of production makes
itself apparent at all levels of the credit system.15
As with social power, trust and the credit system express the tension implicit
in capital. As a claim on future surplus-value, generalised, ‘objective’ credit
assumes all individual capitals’ shared conflict with labour. But, as a contract
that specifies the distribution of surplus-value between interest and profit,
credit expresses one aspect of the tensions inherent in competition between
individual capitals. Hence the ‘trust’ that is integral to capitalist money is
always an alienated trust. After all, Simmel, while deeply critical of Marxism,
was a close colleague of Georg Lukács:16 trust is false consciousness!
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17 See especially Zelizer 1994.
18 Lapavitsas 2003, p. 124ff.; Fine and Lapavitsas 2000. Others outside Marxism, such
as Geoffrey Ingham, share the aspiration for a theory of money-in-general, and criticise
Zelizer’s argument of ‘multiple monies’, but, at this point, invoke a refutation of a
theory of money grounded in the labour theory of value. See Ingham 1998, and 2001.
19 Fine and Lapavitsas 2000, pp. 360; 364.
20 In particular, we leave to one side the proposition of Lapavitsas that ‘capitalist
markets and money can act as templates for analysis of markets in other societies,
provided that the distinction between substance and form of value is appreciated
fully’ (2003, p. 130).
The notions of social power and trust in these domains are probably
straightforward in principle. But the form of social power and trust is always
different in different ‘communities’. Hence, theories which focus on these
dimensions of capitalist money are always vulnerable to the problem of
comparing power and trust across ‘communities’. While our concern is with
global finance – capitalist money beyond the nation-state, it is useful to look
first, and briefly, at the problematic of money across different social contexts.
The contribution of Zelizer17 has become well known for its forthright
challenge to Marxists (and others) emphasising the capitalist nature of money.
Her sociological studies of money in different social contexts contend that
money plays different roles in different contexts, and is thus socially embedded.
According to her, there can be no theory of ‘money-in-general’, there can only
be a theory of ‘multiple monies’.
This is a criticism that Lapavitsas has sought to challenge so as to re-assert
the legitimacy of a Marxist theory of money.18 Fine and Lapavitsas argue that:
For Zelizer, money is bound by social factors and customs, hence it is
heterogeneous in nature. We argue instead that, precisely because it possesses
a homogeneous aspect, money can fluidly express a variety of social relations.
Our argument . . . is that abstract labour provides the common aspect 
of commodities but diverse concrete labours become systematically
commensurate only under specific social and historical conditions, that is,
capitalism.19
The argument then unfolds predictably: money, as the universal equivalent
form of value, provides the means to commensurate the substantive abstract
labour embodied in the form of concrete labour.
Now, many readers may, at this point, wish to challenge Fine and Lapavitsas’s
reliance on the form and substance dichotomy.20 We will stay with their
response as it is posed, and point to a simple consequence: the ‘substance’
to which they point is neither founded in the domain of trust or of social
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21 Simmel 1978, p. 172.
22 Weber 1965, p. 185.
23 Ingham 2000.
24 Lapavitsas’s (2000) excellent summary of Marx’s theory of money shows clearly
the centrality of commodity money to Marx’s analysis of money. But twenty-first
century money is another matter, and Lapavitsas’s analysis of contemporary money
(e.g. 2003) has left commodity money aside.
25 We are drawn to Fleetwood’s (2000) explanation of the necessity of commodity
money to the integrity of Marx’s theory of value, but not to his (tentative) conclusions
that the abandonment of commodity money means the end of a universal equivalent
form of value. Nor is there the question of why nation-states have abandoned the
universal equivalent and the value-form. This appears a rather instrumentalist approach
to value theory, and, more critically, fails to open up the terms on which Marxian
value theory can be used to understand new forms of money
power, in which Lapavitsas grounds his social theory of capitalist money, but
in the domain of commodity relations. In doing so, Lapavitsas and Fine back
themselves into a corner, for the focus on trust and economic power cannot
be readily reconciled with an abstract-labour theory of money. Simmel, who
gave focus to the issue of trust and the unifying, binding social role of money,
was clearly opposed to the direction of analysis proposed by Fine and
Lapavitsas. For him, economic power and trust are concepts that point to a
purely sociological explanation of money.21 Economic power and trust help
to explain the evolution of money, not its distinctly capitalist role. Hence,
Max Weber was apposite when he criticised Simmel for failing to distinguish
between a ‘money economy’ and ‘capitalism’.22
The problem is that a Marxist theory of money-in-general cannot invoke
the social power of money and trust, unless it is to adopt an ahistorical theory
of power and of trust, which would deny, or at least exclude, precisely 
the issue of the capitalist nature of money under capitalism. Ultimately,
Ingham was right: in invoking a general theory of money via abstract labour,
Lapavitsas and Fine need a commodity theory of money, for only commodity
money can be framed in terms of the universal equivalent form of value.23
Unfortunately, few Marxists, including Fine and Lapavitsas,24 wish to go down
the commodity-money path in explaining contemporary money-in-general.25
Marxist value analyses, however, need to resolve this question of commodity
money. It is a requirement for a Marxist general theory of money.
So what is the connection between commodity money and a theory of
money-in-general? Lapavitsas has sought to reconcile this reliance on a theory
of commodity money with the apparent contemporary dominance of ‘valueless’
(fiat and credit) money. The argument, in essence, is that commodity money
is the ‘fundamental’, ‘elementary’ form of money, but ‘in the performance of
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26 Lapavitsas 2000, p. 654.
27 Fine 2003, p. 9. Emphasis added.
its functions, it develops into more advanced, and typically valueless forms
of money’.26 The problem here is that, for Lapavitsas, ‘valueless’ money can
be seen to emerge out of commodity money, but it also leaves commodity
money behind, for he contends that contemporary, ‘valueless’ money no
longer has an anchor in commodity money. Commodity money is thereby
just part of the history and, Lapavitsas would have it, the logic of evolution
of credit and fiat money. But, and this is critical, commodity money does not
give us access to the workings of contemporary money. On the contrary, as
accumulation advances, commodity money falls away. Fine, in another recent
context, struggles to explain the contemporary connection to commodity
money:
Marx’s theory of money is in part based upon the notion that commodity
money is displaced by symbols of money and, hence, indirectly, symbols of
value – although ratification of such symbols ultimately requires intervention
by the state. Paradoxically, it is precisely this displacement in its most modern
form, in which the functions of commodity money or gold are more or less
confined to the reserves of central banks, which leads many to reject Marx’s
monetary theory where they have genuinely considered it. How can a theory
of commodity money, based on value theory, be of relevance when commodity money
is no longer in use. In riposte, it can be argued that Marx’s monetary theory implies
the displacement of commodity money. How this occurs needs to be explored
in theoretical and empirical context, moving beyond the mere symbolic
circulation of values as commodities to incorporate the symbolic, at times
fictitious, circulation of surplus-value. But, this is to anticipate, although it
does root consideration of the currently evolving financial system within
the bounds of the production system on which it depends for its profitability
however much it might wish otherwise.27
There is some unease in reading this sort of statement. It is an articulate
depiction of the current state of Marxian theory in relation to money, but it
does not ultimately work in tying money to abstract labour. Chapter One of
Volume I of Capital does not work if money is just a symbol. Of course, no
Marxist would want to argue that the issues of Chapter One have been
‘displaced’ by historical developments within capitalism. Moreover, what is
the analytical path ‘back’ from symbols to labour time? As we see, from Fine
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28 Ingham 1998, p. 7.
29 Ingham 1984, and 2001.
30 Ingham 2001, p. 315.
and Lapavitsas’s critique of Zelizer, the form of money cannot be allowed to
matter, for as soon as it does, there is no path back from particular forms to
substance – except by assertion. Moreover, the state has sneaked, unannounced,
into Fine’s proposition, ratifying the representations of commodity money –
a proposition which itself opens more questions than it resolves.
Our argument is that Marxists should not be so defensive about commodity
money. It is as if any contemporary reference to commodity money
automatically condemns Marxism to the nineteenth century and to current
irrelevance. This point is made rather starkly by Ingham,28 when he argues
that the ‘emphasis on the production of commodities fails to grasp the relative
autonomy of the development of the means and social relations of production
of modern bank and state credit-money’. Similar to the linguistic turn that
has been employed to denote the shift in philosophy, we see in Ingham’s
analysis what can be labelled a ‘monetary turn’.
The problem is that Marxists, and most critiques of Marxism, have come
to equate commodity money simply with gold. Ingham’s critique of Fine and
Lapavitsas (and of Marxian theories of money) reflects this conflation.29 In
rejecting a Marxist theory of money, Ingham’s immediate recourse is to quote
Marx himself back at Fine and Lapavitsas: ‘“Throughout this work”, Marx
tells us on the first line of Chapter 3 of Capital Volume I, “I assume gold as
the commodity money”’.30
Marx did indeed adhere to that assumption in Capital (although, in other
work, he described bullionism as superstition) and, as Ingham emphasises,
that was the convention of the time. It was the convention because gold was
then the basis of money, and had a value in socially necessary labour time.
But we do not have to take gold as the basic commodity for theorising capitalist
money: it was merely the particular dominant commodity money of the
nineteenth century. Nor should we now necessarily be looking for a commodity
money unit that is ‘like’ gold. Maybe the money commodity need not be
single commodity, and maybe not a physical commodity at all!
Marx’s instincts about money were probably more astute than his analysis.
His instinct was that money had to have commodity characteristics, but it
had also to be abstracted from the characteristics of a particular commodity.
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Indeed, the problem with gold was that it was only a particular commodity
among many, albeit one that could, for a long time, ‘double up’ as the special
money commodity.
Moreover, and to return to our starting point, gold was never distinctly
capitalist money. It is pre-capitalist, even ancient money, cast (literally) into
a capitalist role, and for the most part, under capitalism, it has laid idle in
bank vaults while paper tokens represented it in virtually all monetary
functions. There is nothing more absurd in a capitalist context than having
abstract labour lying idle so that its form (gold) can symbolically play the
role of the equivalent form of value. Distinctly capitalist commodity money
would be a living part of accumulation, not a congealed, dormant, labour
numeraire!
An alternative perspective is that Marxists should not so readily avoid the
implications of commodity money but look to re-construct commodity money
in a form more appropriate to its capitalist role. The problem, and it shows
clearly in Fine’s quote above, is that if we start with a national notion of
money, we need to rely on the state’s role in the provision and guarantee 
of symbolic money, and thus lose any possibility for a (re)conception of
commodity money. For that reason, we prefer to shift the analysis to the level
of global finance, where the nation-state cannot assume the role of deus ex
machina in Marxism’s struggle with the status of commodity money.
Global finance
At this point, we ask the reader to hold alive this issue of the need for a 
re-consideration of commodity money, for we will return to it shortly. We
now turn to a parallel, though narrower, issue: the foundations of global
finance. While Zelizer emphasised the social embeddedness of money in an
anthropological/sociological sense, we can pose the same issue in the context
of global finance. The parallel is that we talk of a global financial system and
globally integrated financial markets, but there is no global state and no global
unit of account (global currency). There are just national units of account
circulating extra-nationally. So the parallel question is: what is the substance
of global money-in-general?
Before providing an answer, we must note that the issues of communal
trust and social power as means to define capitalist money look less robust
in this global context than in the (implicitly assumed) closed community
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31 This is a theme Itoh and Lapavitsas 1999 develop at more length, under the title
‘loss of control over money and finance’. Here we can see them tending to pose
internationalisation as part of the loss of control nation-states have experienced over
money and thus as a potential source of disorder.
32 On this issue, Simmel (1978, p. 172) was clear: ‘only in a stable and closely
organized society that assures mutual protection and provides safeguards against a
variety of elemental dangers, both external and psychological, is it possible for such
a delicate and easily destroyed material as paper to become the representative of the
highest money value’.
33 Ingham 1994, p. 31.
posed above. The explanation of money as social power still ‘works’ on a
global scale as Lapavitsas characterises it, at least as a depiction of the relations
between rich and poor, though (apparently) random shifts in exchange rates
make the power associated with a quantum of money appear arbitrary.31
However, issues of trust become more difficult to interpret in a global context.
The trust question is conventionally posed in a closed economy with state-
issued money because the monetary system is prudentially regulated by the
nation-state, and the law of contract is enforced within a single or unified
jurisdiction.32 On these premises, we can recognise that trust does indeed play
the role characterised by Lapavitsas. But once we leave an idealised national
money system and look at global financial relations, the trust issue becomes
more difficult to interpret. A unit of global money cannot be guaranteed by
any nation-state, or even co-operating nation-states, unless exchange rates
are permanently fixed – the variability in exchange rates means that the
equivalence between any two money units and ‘real’ goods and services is
uncertain. Moreover, the monetary system itself becomes subject to (nationally)
exogenous shocks, and the prudential supervision of the extra-national
operations of ‘local’ financial institutions is ambiguous, often escaping the
jurisdiction of the institution’s ‘home’ state. Trust becomes more complex 
and potentially disengaged from the state. Whether the nation-state (or its
central bank) will play lender of last resort to an institution with imprudent
international exposure – be it Long Term Capital Management, Barings, or
Enron – is a conjunctural political decision.
Ingham has noted this point in arguing that ‘there does not appear to be
a clear enough distinction between state and market power in the production
and management of world money’.33 Furthermore, and following Weber, he
argues that markets have a constant tendency to generate ‘unofficial’ or 
near-money, especially at the level of the world economy. Yet, beyond the
realm of state money, the question of the basis of a general theory of money
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34 Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the US Federal Reserve and hence the world’s
leading banker, has observed that ‘despite extensive efforts on the part of analysts, to
my knowledge, no model projecting directional movements in exchange rates is
significantly superior to tossing a coin’. Greenspan 2004.
35 By the mid-1990s, around one-half of transactions in financial derivatives involved
a non-domestic counterparty (White 1998).
remains unresolved. While Ingham has emphatically rejected Marx’s (gold)
commodity money, in preference for post-Keynesian state money, the global
scale presents a profound problem.
It is in the context of this rather different monetary system, where money
cannot be explained by reference to the state – where volatile shifts in exchange
rates are inexplicable and beyond state regulatory capacity34 – that derivatives,
particularly interest-rate and cross-currency interest-rate swaps, have come
to the fore. Derivatives provide what nation-state fiat money could not provide
on a global scale: they secure some degree of guarantee on the relative values
of different monetary units.35 Derivative markets and derivative products
emerged from relative insignificance in the 1970s precisely because of a loss
of trust in the global stability of monetary units after the end of the Bretton
Woods régime of fixed exchange rates and tight national capital controls.
With high rates of cross-currency capital conversions and volatile exchange
rates, the value of money became uncertain across currencies. International
credit markets could not guarantee real costs to debtors or returns to creditors,
and national central banks, individually and collectively, could not remedy
the situation. In this context, where the material foundations of trust were
absent, derivatives offered hedging facilities that could reduce the costs of
exchange-rate volatility for individual capitalists. They did not, thereby, create
trust in currency values, but they neutralised the consequences of this loss
of trust. Formal contracts guaranteed (for a price) the value of money in a way
that spot foreign-exchange markets and central-bank regulations could not.
But, it must be added, the end of fixed exchange rates and the growth of
exchange-rate volatility were just the proximate catalyst for derivative growth
in the 1980s. Since then, they have developed a much wider and more pervasive
presence across financial markets. Hence, it is important not to overemphasise
the connection between these markets and the crisis of ‘trust’, as if they were
simply a response to a crisis of instability, for financial derivatives more
generally are not so driven.
An irony for our state-centred theorists now becomes apparent. Derivative
issuance and trading had to locate in a space beyond national regulation.
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36 ISDA 2002.
37 Accordingly, we argue, counter-party risk more than scenarios of ‘casino capitalism’
represent the likely scope for financial crisis.
Their capacity to compensate for the loss of trust in global financial stability
logically required that they existed outside the domain of nation-states. Yet,
in these markets, issues of contractual enforcement, often between mutually
unknown parties, became a legal minefield. The inability of a counter-party
to meet their contractual obligations in this highly leveraged market is always
a possibility, thus raising the problem of which jurisdiction should serve to
enforce the law of contract: the jurisdiction of the country of the issuer, of
the counter-party, of the location where the transaction was negotiated or the
contract traded, or, in the case of OTC derivatives, of the country of the service
provider? Hence, ‘trust’ no longer rests on a reliable national money unit of
account, but on the enforceability of contracts: an issue that applies in any
sort of exchange, not just to money.
Indeed, in a global setting, issues of trust in relation to money and finance
start to look different, for there is no neat nexus between trust, the nation-
state, national territory and money. If we were to engage the issue of ‘trust’
in relation to derivatives markets, we would observe that it is no less critical
for derivatives than it is for fiat money, for, in both cases, the money unit is
itself not valued in terms of embodied labour time. But, unlike fiat money,
trust in derivatives is not contingent on nation-states, nor on nationally-
conceived communities. The major source of ‘regulation’ of derivatives, which
ensures compliance with contracts, is now the derivative ‘traders’ industry
organisation, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA),
whose members transact around 80 per cent of all derivative contracts. The
ISDA requires that all members adhere to the Master Agreement on the
enforcement of contracts,36 which secures ‘trust’ in derivative contracts more
effectively than nation-states or international courts. This is not trust based
around conventions of nations or communities, it is capital collectively
commodifying trust! We know, thereby, that it has a particular vulnerability
to failure and hence financial crisis.37
Derivatives and global money
To return to the core theme: what is the substance of global money when the
monies of account that make up global finance are a wide spectrum of national
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38 We will not here pursue the issue that the value of labour-power is location-
specific. But it is a major problem for a theory of global money-in general, as least as
Lapavitsas and Fine have conceived it.
39 As one finance researcher observed, ‘[d]erivatives make international asset
substitution relatively simple’ (Vrolijk 1997).
currencies, and the rate of conversion between them is variable, sometimes
volatile, and certainly beyond formal explanation? If Fine and Lapavitsas’s
proposition that money-in-general is based on abstract labour looked tenuous
in the context of a single community (with a single currency, a single value
of labour-power,38 and a single state) it looks even more stretched in this
global context.
Here is where derivatives become important, for they play the role of
commensurating financial assets whose conversion rates between currencies,
and their interest-rate régimes, cannot be otherwise guaranteed.39 Moreover,
these are not simply locked-in single conversions, such as futures or forward
contracts that specify an exchange rate at an agreed future date (effectively
privately fixed exchange rates), but involve more complex conversions that
have the effect of giving one form of asset the characteristics of another form
of asset – such as a bond, in Japanese yen, whose rate of interest is indexed
to the S&P500. They have the characteristics of both bonds and equities. In
this last example, they give the holder an exposure to US stock values, but
without exposure to the US dollar. The possibilities of such asset blending
are endless, and there are, accordingly, thousands of different derivative
products tailored to specific customer needs.
Because they are traded in enormous volumes, the effect of these contracts
is to broadly commensurate all different forms of financial assets across the
world. The contract just identified blends bonds and equities, but there is
also a plethora of other conversions that blend, for example, particular
currencies with particular equities, currencies with commodity prices, or
bonds with indices of house prices. The blending is virtually limitless, creating
a complex web that links, directly or indirectly, all varieties of assets in all
locations and across a spectrum of temporalities. They provide continuity to
the global financial system and, for individual traders, offer stability in the
rate of conversion between different assets. In the context of global finance,
derivatives do what nation-states cannot: they provide a market-driven
guarantee of convertibility over time.
In terms of money, they perform the role in international finance that gold
played in the nineteenth century: they anchor the global financial system.
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While gold was a fixed anchor (all national currencies and commodity prices
had to adjust to gold), derivatives provide a floating anchor; an on-going,
flexible web of conversions that binds the world’s asset markets.
The comparison with gold is important, for one may recognise that
derivatives now play some aspects of the role gold once played as a globally-
recognised facility of equivalence. But the critical difference is that gold’s
value was determined (notionally, at least) by the socially-necessary abstract
labour involved in gold’s production. Derivatives do not have this same,
simple link to embodied labour. The $2,300 billion per day traded in OTC
derivative markets is not obviously related to embodied labour in ‘derivative
production’. It is made up of the notional amount of financial assets that are
tied up in derivative contracts, and, only in miniscule proportions, of the
value of the labour of financial service providers (mainly banks) that compile
and execute the contracts. Indeed, this miniscule amount of labour alone does
not make derivatives commodity money any more than labour at the national
mint makes fiat money commodity money. It is what this labour ‘sets in
motion’ that is critical. Derivatives are not merely contracts. They embody
within them on-going mechanisms of re-calculation, so that the value of our
bond (above) is continually adjusting to movements in the yen and the S&P500.
Each such derivative contract is, in itself, a continually adjusting element in
the financial commensuration process. Yet, insofar as derivative contracts are
‘produced’, the in-built mechanisms of calculation their production set in
motion give derivatives the capacity to commensurate different forms, locations,
and temporalities of capital. They are thereby commodities that play multiple
monetary functions. This commodified commensuration is what makes financial
derivatives fundamentally different from other paper titles, such as fiat money
and shares.
Fiat money derives its price from its political acceptability in circulation.
There must be explicit and calculated state controls on the quantity of fiat
money produced (put in circulation), or the money unit itself is debased via
inflation. But this is not the case with derivatives, and so issues of trust are
entirely different. Each derivative contract pertains to specific extant assets:
options, futures and swaps must be settled according to a particular derivative
contract, and there are no derivatives that do not have counterparties. This
is inherent in the role of derivatives play in commensurating different parts
(forms, localities, temporalities) of capital. It ensures a material basis to the
quantity and value of derivatives in circulation.
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40 Of course, in a technical sense, they can perform monetary functions when, for
example, shares are used to settle a debt but any commodity can be used in this
function, so it can safely be ignored. The liquidity characteristics of many shares now
certainly rival bank deposits, so we are here making no strict distinction between
money and near money or money substitutes.
41 Put another way, shares are tied to particular individual forms of capital, but are
not used to commensurate other forms of capital. IBM shares are not used directly to
price Daimler Chrysler shares, and more importantly to commensurate oil prices. But
it is this commensuration process that is ‘built into’ derivatives that gives them a
money function.
42 Importantly here, almost all commodity derivatives are settled in cash, and more
importantly, the overwhelming number and value of financial derivatives are transacted
in forms denominated in fiat or near money.
43 It can be noted that there is a vague parallel here with neoclassical economics.
In their own unique abstraction of perfect information and perfect markets, the
neoclassicals contend that financial derivatives serve to ‘complete’ markets. In this
sense, they have been called Arrow-Debreu securities.
In a different context, Wennerlind argues via a linguistic parallel: ‘capital tries hard
to eliminate . . . rigidities and barriers so that the ideal speech situation for money
can be established’ (Wennerlind 2001, p. 568).
How, then, do derivatives differ from shares? While derivatives and shares
both have a foundation in capital, and in a necessary but not sufficient sense
labour, shares are not money.40 The key difference between the two in a
monetary sense is that any monetary function of shares is largely incidental –
a side-effect of growing liquidity in stock markets. The critical and distinctive
attribute of shares is ownership of a (notional) bit of a corporation, and thus
shares play a role in the market for corporate control. Shares are also direct
claims to dividend streams. This attachment to ownership gives shares a
materiality, but also ‘grounds’ them in a particular and unique asset. The sale
or purchase of shares is first of all about changing titles to ownership, not
about establishing equivalence.41 Derivatives, however, do not relate to the
ownership of any particular, unique ‘bit’ of capital, for derivative transactions
remain entirely within the monetary sphere without any necessary ‘conversion’
into concrete assets.42
It should now be apparent why we want to identify derivatives as money,
instead of just insurance contracts. It is because derivative contracts ‘set in
motion’ a computational process that builds bridges between, and reconciles,
different forms of capital into a singular empirical concept of capital. Derivatives,
therefore, give us access to capital-in-general through which the path from
abstract labour to money-in-general must run.43
The corollary is that we have to countenance the notion that the commodity
money may be very different from the meaning attached to gold. Although
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this alternative commodity money is not based in primitive notions of
preciousness, or on neoclassical notions of scarcity, it is not as challenging
for Marxist theory as it may first appear. Marxists are, after all, not physiocrats,
for they value not the physical qualities of the money commodity, but its
clear representation of equivalence based in abstract labour. This representation
comes not from taking the concrete labour of a particular physical commodity
(historically gold) and endowing it with universal meaning. The attachment
to gold was not to abstract labour, but to particular concrete labour, because
there were no clear mechanisms to commensurate labour in gold with all
other labour. Hence, under the Gold Standard, gold could never trade at its
cost of production.
On the contrary, the representation of abstract labour can only be found
within capital-in-general. Company shares or bonds, both individually and
collectively, cannot express capital-in-general in the same way, for they are
tied to a particular ‘bit’ of capital. Derivatives, on the other hand, though not
individually but collectively, actively commensurate all these different ‘bits’
of capital, and thereby create an empirical notion of capital-in-general. In
short, derivatives break the distinction between ‘money’ and ‘capital’, and
thereby make ‘money’ an integral part of capitalist accumulation.
Conclusion
To return once more to our starting point: derivatives are not just money
within capitalism; they are distinctly capitalist money, for they embody, in
their very ‘design’, the process of competition and accumulation. Unlike gold,
their generalised use in transactions would have no meaning in feudalism.
Derivatives provide the key to a general theory of capitalist money, rather
than just an example of money under capitalism. To be sure, not all money
is derivatives, and daily life is transacted in symbolic money, designated in
‘local’ state-administered units of account. But a general theory of money
must ask what is the substance that unites these various local monies. Zelizer
asked this question at the micro-level, and concluded that all monies are
‘different’. With Fine and Lapavitsas, we want to contend that they have
something in common, but we believe that the key for a general theory lays
at the global level, not just the national level. At this level, issues of social
power, trust, and nation-state guarantees do not provide the foundations for
a general theory. A focus on trust and state money can offer insights in the
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evolution of money, and social power must be recognised as a function of
money (of whatever sort); but none offers an explanation of money itself.
In a globally-integrated, but not unified, financial system, the question is:
how does capital itself secure the substance of the global money unit? The
answer is that it continually transforms part of capital into financial derivatives.
This does not mean that capital abandons state money, for the various state
monies provide the various units of account of global finance, but the range
of state guarantees for the integrity of each currency is simply not sufficient.
Derivatives bind the global financial system into an integrated unity in a way
that states cannot.
We can thereby posit derivatives as the expression of a distinctly global
money, operating at a higher level of generality than national currencies.
Moreover, we can see here a path back to commodity money – not just via
an analogy with the role of gold in the nineteenth century, though there are
elements of that, but also via a contrast with gold as the chosen commodity
money. As commodity money, gold stood outside of accumulation. Its
production was part of accumulation, and that gave the critical definitional
(but purely definitional) connection to labour time. But beyond that point,
the labour embodied in gold ceased to be part of accumulation. It assumed
the status of a religious icon, locked up in Fort Knox and other national
repositories – and even these are being sold off. Derivatives, on the other
hand, are not physical commodities. Embodied labour cannot be locked up
in them because it is ‘alive’ within the derivatives themselves through the
conversions and the commensuration that these derivatives accomplish. Gold
was a static commodity money – a benchmark against which other values
could be measured. By contrast, derivatives, via their flexibility, constitute a
diverse, dynamic, and distinctly capitalist commodity money, which is better
suited to the new conditions of accumulation we now live in.
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